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UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS AT LITTLE ROCK
LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 3 1980 NUMBER 1
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT*
Raoul Berger**
At the height of Franklin Roosevelt's 1937 Court-Packing cam-
paign, Professor Felix Frankfurter wrote to him:
People have been taught to believe that when the Supreme Court
speaks it is not they who speak but the Constitution, whereas, of
course, in so many vital cases, it is they who speak and not the
Constitution. And I verily believe that is what the country needs
most to understand.'
Forty years have passed and that lesson has yet to be learned. Pro-
fessor Philip Kurland has written that the "most immediate consti-
tutional problem of our present time is the usurpation by the judici-
ary of general governmental powers on the pretext that its authority
derives from the Fourteenth Amendment."' Under that guise the
Court requires busing, governs abortion, renders State control of
pornography all but impossible, curbs death penalties and super-
vises State administration of criminal law. My documentation of
this situation in "Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of
the Fourteenth Amendment" has provoked some splenetic criti-
cism.' The outrage of academe is not surprising because the Warren
Court's reapportionment and desegregation decisions, as Professor
* This article was originally presented as a University of Arkansas at Little Rock Don-
aghey Lecture at the UALR School of Law on September 28, 1979. The lecture series is funded
by a gift from the Donaghey Foundation.
** Mr. Berger was for many years a practicing lawyer; he taught at the University of
California, Berkeley; and until 1976 he was Charles Warren Senior Fellow in American Legal
History, Harvard University.
1. ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE 1928-1945 383 (M. Freedman
ed. 1967).
2. Letter from Philip Kurland to Harvard University Press (August 15, 1977).
3. E.g., Brest, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1977 (Book Rev. Section) 10; Miller,
Book Review, Washington Post, Nov. 13, 1977, p.E-5; Murphy, Book Review, 87 YALE L.J.
1752 (1978). For my replies, see Berger, Academy v. The Founding Fathers, NATIONAL REViEW,
April 14, 1978 at 468; Berger, The Scope of Judicial Review and Walter Murphy, 1979 Wis.
L. REv. 341.
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Richard Kay wrote, "have now become second nature to a genera-
tion of lawyers and scholars," so that "the casting of a fundamental
doubt on such basic assumptions. . produces shock, dismay, and
sometimes anger."' But it needs to be remembered, as one activist
critic observed, that these doctrines really represent a "New
Faith."5
Professor Stanley Kutler notes that as late as 1940 academi-
cians criticized the "abusive power of the federal judiciary" for
"frustrating desirable social policies," for arrogating "a policymak-
ing function unwarranted by the Constitution," thereby "negating
the basic principles of representative government."' Afterwards, he
continues, "most of the judiciary's longtime critics suddenly found
a new faith"; now an "activist judiciary" promoted "preferred free-
doms" that matched the "new libertarianism."' But, as Professor
Archibald Cox wrote,
those impulses were not shared so strongly and widely as to realize
themselves through legislation. They came to be held after the
early 1950s by a majority of the Supreme Court Justices, perhaps
by the fate which puts one man upon the Court rather than an-
other, perhaps because the impulses were more strongly felt in the
world of the highly educated.'
More bluntly, an intellectual elite, because it knows what is best for
the people, maintains that the Court must be free to impose its will
on the nation. The values of this elite are mine; I have no love for
segregation; nor would I defend apportionment that heavily weights
the vote of a rural voter against a city dweller. But as long ago as
1942 I refused to make my predilections the test of constitution-
ality.? Because I consider a given result desirable does not make it
constitutional, as both the Framers and Chief Justice Marshall long
since emphasized. The test of constitutionality is not whose ox is
gored.
We are dealing with a question of power: who is to govern in
our democracy, who is to make policy choices for the nation-a
4. Kay, Book Review, 10 CONN. L. REv. 801 (1978); and see Kommers, Book Review,
THE REVIEW OF PoLrics 409 (1978).
5. Kutler, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amendment: A History or A Historical, 6
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511, 513 (1979).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. A. Cox, THE RoLE OF THE SupmMz Courr iN AmRICAN Gov zNMT 35 (1976).
9. Berger, Constructive Contempt: A Post-Mortem, 9 U. CH. L. Rev. 602 (1962).
[Vol. 3:1
ROLE OF SUPREME COURT
group of unelected and virtually unaccountable Justices or the
elected representatives of the people, indeed, the people
themselves? The Founders adopted a written Constitution because
they dreaded usurpations by power-hungry Caesars and sought to
limit and diffuse the power they delegated.'0 They believed in a
"fixed Constitution" with bounds that no delegate would overleap,
and they provided for change in the future by the process of amend-
ment submitted to the people." Little did they dream that the
Court would short-circuit the amendment process on the plea, ad-
vanced by academe, that it is too cumbersome. Poor deluded women
who are still struggling to procure ratification of the Equal Rights
Amendment when the Court could so readily redress a felt inequal-
ity!
The issue I pose is narrow: if the framers of the fourteenth
amendment clearly intended to exclude suffrage from its scope-as
the later provision by the fifteenth amendment for non-
discriminatory suffrage confirms-whence does the Supreme Court
derive power to hold that the fourteenth amendment demands "One
person-one vote,' 2 thus manifestly contradicting the framers' ex-
clusion of suffrage from the scope of the amendment? An activist
critic of my views, Professor Louis Lusky, stated that Justice Har-
lan's demonstration, in dissent, to that effect was "irrefutable and
unrefuted.' 3 Another activist, Professor Nathaniel Nathanson,
agrees and adds that Alexander Bickel "conclusively" demonstrated
that segregation was likewise excluded, and that "Berger's indepen-
dent research and analysis confirms and adds weight to those con-
clusions."'" Eight or nine other reviewers, including activists, con-
cur. But I would not rest on a count of noses, and take leave to
spread a few confirmatory facts before you.
Justice Brennan, himself a perfervid activist, observed that
seventeen Northern States had rejected black suffrage in 1865-
1868.'1 Understandably, Roscoe Conkling, a member of the Joint
10. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 12-16 (1969).
11. P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTrrUTION 7 (1978).
12. R. BERGER, GovERNMENT BY JUDIcIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FoURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 4 (1977).
13. Lusky, "Government by Judiciary:" What Price Legitimacy? 6 HAsTrGs CONST.
L.Q. 402, 406 (1979).
14. Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEx. L. REv. 579, 580-81 (1978).
15. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 255-56 (1970) (dissenting in part).
19801
UALR LAW JOURNAL
Committee on Reconstruction of both Houses, which drafted the
fourteenth amendment, stated,
The northern States, most of them, do not permit negroes to vote.
Some of them repeatedly and lately pronounced against it ...
would it not be futile to ask three-quarters of the States to do fdr
themselves and others, by ratifying such an amendment, the very
thing most of them have already refused to do in their own cases."
Another member of the Committee, Senator Jacob Howard,
who explained the amendment to the Senate, said that "three-
fourths of the States could not be induced to grant the right of
suffrage even in any degree or under any restriction to the colored
race."' 7 The Report of the Joint Committee-such reports are held
to be the best evidence of legislative intention-said that "the
States would not surrender a power they had exercised, and to
which they were attached," and therefore concluded to "leave the
whole question with the people of each State."'" Summing up in
1974, former Solicitor General Robert Bork stated, "The principle
of one man one vote . . . runs counter to the text of the fourteenth
amendment, the history surrounding its adoption and ratification,
and the political practice of Americans from colonial times to the
day the Court invented the new formulas.""9
Consider next the sources of judicial review. It was an innova-
tion,20 asserted in a few pre-1787 State cases, proceeding for viola-
tions of express constitutional provisions, such as trial by jury.
2'
None of them represented a take-over of legislative policy, let alone
constitutional revision. Even so, a few cases elicited stor'my disap-
proval, leading to removal proceedings,2 because the Founders were
attached to legislative paramountcy. "In Republican Government,"
Madison stated in The Federalist, "the legislative authority neces-
sarily predominates."2 3 Understandably Hamilton assured the Rati-
16. CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong., 1st. Sess. 358 (1865-1866).
17. Id. at 2766.
18. Quoted in R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 84 (1977).
19. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 18
(1971).
20. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *91; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531
(1884).
21. Berger, "Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 13-17 (1979).
22. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 40-42 (1969).
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 338 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
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fiers that of the three branches "the judiciary is next to nothing."2
No specific provision for judicial review is made in the Constitution.
Learned Hand, Archibald Cox and Leonard Levy consider the evi-
dence that the Framers contemplated judicial review is inconclu-
sive. 15 The argument for judicial review has largely been rested on
the Framers' intention as disclosed in the legislative history. If that
be relied on to establish the power, it cannot be disregarded as to
its scope. The current dismissal of resort to the original intention
for the meaning the terms employed by the Framers had for them"
would undermine the legitimacy of judicial review itself. No one
would contend, for example, that Congress or the Court can change
the constitutional provision for a 2-year term in the House to a 4-
year term. Is there better reason to reject the framers' unmistakable
intention to exclude suffrage from the fourteenth amendment? Jus-
tice Holmes held that judges may not say "we see what you are
driving at, but you have not said it."2
Judicial participation in legislative policy-making was categori-
cally rejected by the Framers. It had been proposed to make the
Justices members of a Council of Revision that would assist the
President in exercising the veto power, on the ground that "laws
may be dangerous, unwise . . . and yet not so unconstitutional as
to justify judges in refusing to give them effect." But Elbridge
Gerry objected, "it was quite foreign from the nature of ye office to
make them judges of the policy of public measures." Nathaniel
Gorham chimed in that judges "are not presumed to possess a pecu-
liar knowledge of the mere policy of public measures";" and Rufus
King added that judges "ought not to be legislators."31 So judicial
participation in policymaking was rejected. Then too, as Gordon
Wood found, the colonists had "a profound fear of judicial . . .
discretion,"" pungently expressed in 1767 by Chief Justice Hutchin-
son of Massachusetts: "The Judges should never be legislators. Be-
cause then the Will of the Judge would be the law; and this tends
24. Id., No. 78 at 504n.
25. For citations see BERGER, supra note 18, at 355; L. HAND, THE BiLL OF iRGHTS 15
(1958).
26. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 3.
27. Johnson v. United States, 162 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908).
28. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 73 (1911).
29. 1 id. 97, 98.
30. 2 id. 73.
31. 1 id. 108.
32. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1787-1789 298 (1969).
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to a state of slavery."33 Montesquieu, the constantly cited oracle in
the several constitutional conventions, had written that if the Judge
were to be the Legislator, the "life and liberty of the subject would
be subject to arbitrary control."" Such were the suppositions the
Founders brought to fashioning judicial review.
A cluster of remarks by Hamilton, the great apologist for judi-
cial review, that narrow its scope, has been too little noticed. Echo-
ing Montesquieu, he stated, "there is no liberty, if the power of
judging be not separated from the legislative and executive pow-
ers." 3 Having divorced judging from legislation, he hardly contem-
plated that legislation could be taken over by the judiciary. Instead
he wrote that courts may not "on the pretense of a repugnancy...
substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the
legislature. ' 3 That is, they may not intrude within the boundaries
of legislative power. For as James Bradley Thayer, Learned Hand,
and Justice James Iredell long before them, emphasized, courts are
confined to policing constitutional boundaries to insure that the
departments do not "overleap" their bounds.37 And Hamilton said
that "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensa-
ble that they should be bound down by strict rules and preced-
ents. 13 Is it conceivable that he would have held judges are less
bound by the unmistakable will of the Framers than by their own
precedents? Hamilton also assured the Ratifiers that judges would
be impeached for "deliberate usurpations on the authority of the
legislature. ,39 All this testifies that the Founders were worried about
the innovative judicial review; and it explains why it was conceived
in narrow terms from which a take-over of legislative and constitu-
tional policymaking was plainly excluded. In the 1866 debates, dis-
trust of the courts, arising from the Dred Scott and Fugitive Slave
decisions, was repeatedly expressed,"° and it led to section five,
which the Court held in 1879 conferred enforcement of the amend-
33. Quoted in M. Horowitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of American
Law 1780-1820, in FIVE PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 292 (1971).
34. C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRrr OF THE LAWS, bk. 11, ch. 6 at 181 (Philadelphia 1802).
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 at 504 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
36. Id., No. 78 at 507.
37. For citations to Hand and Thayer, see BERGER, supra note 18, at 305 n.26; for Iredell,
see Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 266 (1736).
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 at 510 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
39. Id., No. 81 at 526-27.
40. See BERGER, supra note 18, at 222-23.
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ment on Congress, not the courts.'
Let us now consider a few activist rationalizations of what Pro-
fessor Lusky describes as "the Court's new and grander conception
of its own place in the governmental scheme, its assertion of power
to revise the Constitution, bypassing the cumbersome amendment
procedure,"42 what Professor Alfred Kelly complacently termed a
"constitutional revolution." 3 Hamilton declared, however, that "an
agent cannot new model his own commission."" Conventional apol-
ogetics for the Court's "new and grander" role largely rests on the
so-called "general" words of the fourteenth amendment: "due pro-
cess of law," "equal protection of the laws," and "privileges or im-
munities." These allegedly "open-ended" terms are regarded as an
"invitation" to the courts to adapt the amendment to present day
needs. 5 "Due process," to begin with, is not a "general" term, but
one of fixed historical meaning. Summing up 400 years of English
and colonial practice, Hamilton said on the eve of the Convention,
"The words 'due process' have a precise technical import, and are
applicable only to the process and proceedings of the courts . . .
they can never be referred to an act of the legislature."" When I
combed the 1866 debates I found that all references to due process
were in procedural terms. 7 The Court has confessed that
"substantive economic due process"-a judicial construct of the
1890s to halt the spread of "socialism"-is now discredited. 8 But
resort to due process for protection of "liberty" also collides with
Hamilton's statement that due process never applies to legislation.
Moreover, liberty and property stand on a par in the due process
clause, and as Judge Learned Hand observed, "There is no constitu-
tional basis for asserting a larger measure of judicial supervision
[over "liberty" than property].""
41. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879); see also BERGER, supra note 18, at 221-
229.
42. Lusky, supra note 13, at 408.
43. Kelly, CLIO AND THE COURT: AN ILLICIT LOVE AFFAIR, 1965 S. CT. REV. 119, 158 (1965).
44. 6 A. HAMILTON, Letters of Camillus, in WORKS OF HAMILTON 166 (Lodge ed. 1904).
45. See Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399
(1978); and reply Government by Judiciary, John Hart Ely's "Invitation," 54 IND. L.J. 277
(1979).
46. 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 35 (H. Syrett and J. Cooke eds. 1962).
47. BERGER, supra note 18, at 201-06.
48. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,
730 (1963).
49. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 50-51 (1962).
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Until the very recent past "equal protection" was dormant.
"The new equal protection," said Professor Kurland, "is the old
substantive due process." 50 As Professor Herbert Packer put it, "the
new 'substantive equal protection' has under a different label per-
mitted today's justices to impose their prejudices in much the same
manner as the Four Horsemen once did,"'" and with no more consti-
tutional warrant.
How can "equal protection" comprehend the suffrage that was
so clearly excluded? Men do not use words to defeat their purposes.
That is why Justice Holmes and Judge Learned Hand reiterated the
centuries-old doctrine that the "manifest purpose overrides the
text." 51 Activists would read into the text an implied intent to over-
rule the framers' express intention to exclude suffrage, and this in
the teeth of the tenth amendment's reservation to the States of all
powers not granted. That reservation, expressing an attachment to
States rights, often voiced in the 39th Congress which drafted the
amendment,5 3 is not to be curtailed by implication. Such an impli-
cation, moreover, is rebutted by several facts: (1) The debates show
that the amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, enacted at
the same session, were deemed to be "identical." 5 The amendment
was designed to "constitutionalize" the Act and to prevent its re-
peal.55 The Act banned discrimination solely with respect to owner-
ship of property, the right to contract, and access to the
courts-rights, the framers repeatedly stressed, that were carefully
enumerated. Initially that enumeration had been preceded by a
phrase prohibiting "discrimination in civil rights and immuni-
ties."5 But John Bingham, draftsman of the several clauses of the
amendment, protested that the phrase was "oppressive," that it
struck down all discriminations and invaded the province of the
States. 7 Hence the phrase was deleted to obviate a "latitudinarian"
construction going "beyond the specific rights named in the sec-
50. Forum: Equal Protection and The Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645, 661
(1975).
51. Packer, The Aim of the Criminal Law Revisited: A Plea for a New Look at
"Substantive Due Process", 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 490, 491-92 (1971).
52. For Holmes, see supra note 27; for Hand, see Cawley v. United States, 272 F.2d 443,
445 (2d Cir. 1959).
53. See BERGER, supra note 18, at 60-64.
54. Id. at 22-23.
55. BERGER, supra note 18, at 23.
56. Id. at 24.
57. Id. at 119-21.
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tion." I No activist has explained why Bingham now meant to give
"equal protection" the very broad scope he had condemned in the
Act. (2) Throughout the debates on the Act the framers interchange-
ably referred to "equality before the law," and "equal protection"
but always in the circumscribed context of the enumerated rights.
So, Samuel Shellabarger told the House that the Bill secures
"equality of protection in the enumerated rights."5 Again and again
the framers were assured that suffrage was left untouched both by
the Act and by the amendment. This responded to deep seated,
openly avowed Negrophobia and attachment to States rights.60 How
did "equal protection" take on a new, unlimited meaning when it
was transplanted to the amendment? The Supreme Court has held
that the meaning given to a term in an earlier act will be presumed
to be the same in a later act that is in pari materia.11 (3) The
framers' repeated rejection of attempts to prohibit all discrimina-
tions shows that "equal protection" was not designed to be all-
inclusive.2 Activists have yet to explain these facts away.
Time will not permit detailed discussion of the "privileges or
immunities" clause, reduced to a dead letter by the Slaughter
House Cases. 3 "Privileges or immunities" were words of art, as an
activist, Professor Walter Murphy, concedes I have "amply" dem-
onstrated.64 The phrase, the debates show, was drawn from Article
IV; it had been construed by several courts to be limited to the
protection of person and property, as was explained during the de-
bates on the Civil Rights Act. 5 These rights were carefully enumer-
ated in the Act. Justice Field, joined in dissent in the Slaughter
House Cases by Justice Bradley and two other Justices, said,
"What, then, are the privileges and immunities which are secured
against abridgment by State legislators? In the first section of the
Civil Rights Act Congress has given its interpretation of these
terms ... ."66 In light of this history, it is a perversion to label the
terms of the amendment as "general" words of indeterminate mean-
ing, and even more perverse to read them to embrace the suffrage
58. Id. at 122.
59. Id. at 169-70.
60. Id. at 13, 60-63.
61. Reiche v. Smythe, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 162, 165 (1871).
62. BERGER, supra note 18, at 163-64.
63. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
64. Murphy, Book Review, 87 YALE L.J. 1752, 1758 (1978).
65. BERGER, supra note 18, at 20-36.
66. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96 (1872).
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that was so plainly excluded. As said by Professor Bork, even if the
words are general,
surely that would not permit us to escape the framers' intent if it
were clear. If the legislative history revealed a consensus about
segregation in the schools and other relations of life, I do not see
how the Court could escape the choices revealed and substitute its
own. 7
A tentative justification was attempted by Alexander Bickel's
"open-ended" theory, which has become the activists' mainstay.
"What," he asked, "if any thought was given to the long range effect
of the amendment in the future?" Could resort to "equal protection
of the laws," he inquired, "have failed to leave the implication that
the new phrase . . . was more receptive to a 'latitudinarian'
construction?" "It remains true," he acknowledged, "that an ex-
plicit provision going further than the Civil Rights Act could not
have carried in the 39th Congress," that the Republicans drew back
from a "formulation dangerously vulnerable to attacks pandering to
the prejudice of the people." But, he speculated, "may it not be that
the Moderates and Radicals reached a compromise permitting them
to go to the country with language which they could, where neces-
sary, defend against damaging alarms raised by the opposition but
which at the same time was sufficiently elastic to permit reasonable
future advances."6 1 Bickel's hypothesis, to speak plainly, is that the
alleged compromisors concealed the future objectives they dared not
avow lest the whole enterprise be imperiled. There is not a shred of
evidence for such a conspiracy, and there is evidence that there was
no need for compromise because suffrage proposals were defeated by
votes of 125 to 12 and 34 to 4.61 Moreover, ratification requires dis-
closure and non-disclosure of the concealed objectives prevented
effective ratification.7
Another activist refuge is Marshall's famous dictum in
McCulloch v. Maryland: "[W]e must never forget that it is a
constitution we are expounding . . . a constitution intended to en-
dure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the
67. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 13
(1971).
68. Quoted in BERGER, supra note 18, at 101-02, 104-05.
69. Id. at 59-60, 95.
70. See, id. at 155 n.93.
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various crises of human affairs."' For activists this dictum is the
rock of ages. But as Justice Black repeatedly observed, the Framers
supplied an instrument for adaptation, Article V, which provides for
amendment by the people-the only provision for change.72 In Ham-
ilton's great defense of judicial review, No. 78 of The Federalist, he
declared, "until the people have by some solemn and authoritative
act, annulled or changed the established form, it is binding. . . and
no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant
their representatives in a departure from it prior to such an act.
'73
Mark that Hamilton left no room for judicial divination of "social
ideals" as an excuse for judicial revision of the Constitution. To
recur to Marshall, he spoke for a less confining construction of the
means that Congress might employ to carry out its granted powers.
When the decision came under attack, Marshall unequivocally dis-
claimed any intimation that the powers of Congress could be ex-
panded by construction. And he specifically repudiated the notion
that the Court enjoyed a "right to change" the Constitution. As
Professor Gerald Gunther commented, it is time to discard "ritual
invoking of Marshall's authority" for "unlimited . . .discretion."75
In conclusion, the fundamental issue is the right of the people
to govern themselves through the medium of representative assem-
blies; not to be governed by a non-elected, life-tenured judicial oli-
garchy that is all but unaccountable. Activists proudly affirm that
the Court has worked a social revolution:" but it was not designed
to serve as an instrument of revolution. It has taken over policy-
making, that is, governance of the nation. With Learned Hand, I do
not want to be governed by 9-often only 5-Platonic Guardians.77
Although the democracy often goes down paths that make me un-
happy, I will not make my predilections the test of constitutionality.
John Stuart Mill cautioned that "The disposition of mankind...
to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct
for others. . . is hardly kept under restraint by anything but want
of power."7"
71. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407-08 (1819).
72. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
73. THE FEDERAusT No. 78 at 509 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
74. BERGER, supra note 18, at 376-77.
75. Quoted in id. at 378 n.19.
76. E.g., Kelly, supra note 43, at 158.
77. HAND, supra note 49, at 73.
78. Quoted in BERGER, supra note 18, at 413 n.20.
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My commitment is to the Constitution, not to a given result,
and I cannot condone a judicial decision, however desirable, that
exercises a power that plainly was withheld. Our democracy rests
on respect by our agents for constitutional limitations. When we
countenance extra-constitutional measures because we deem the
result desirable we undermine the democratic structure. Disrespect,
we learned from Watergate, breeds a Nixon. Whether it be a Ri-
chard Nixon or a Chief Justice Warren, we must insist on observ-
ance of constitutional limits. Lest you dismiss me as a Cassandra,
let me remind you of Washington's warning to those impatient with
the amendment process:
[Liet there be no change by usurpation, for though this, in one
instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary
weapon by which free governments are destroyed."
Finally, a number of activists have expressed anxiety about a
judicial power that is without "limits," 0 but they are at odds as to
what those limits should be. An easily ascertainable "limit," I sug-
gest, is the clearly expressed intention of the framers to exclude
suffrage and segregation from the scope of the fourteenth amend-
ment and hence from judicial review. That represents a choice rati-
fied by the people, requiring obedience on every principle of our
democratic system. Ours is a government founded on consent of the
governed. James Iredell, one of the ablest proponents of judicial
review, stated, "The people have chosen to be governed by such and
such principles. They have not consented to be governed or prom-
ised to submit upon any other."'8 A written Constitution is sub-
verted by a theory that leaves the Justices free to jettison the mean-
ing attached by the framers to their words. With Learned Hand, I
would maintain that "If we do need a third chamber it should ap-
pear for what it is, not as the interpreter of inscrutable principles." '2
That will be the moment of truth.
79. Quoted in id. at 299.
80. Ely, supra note 45, at 448; he finds the prospect "frightening". Id. at 477 n.28;
Abraham, "Equal Justice Under Law"or "Justice at Any Cost?" The Judicial Role Revisited:
Raoul Bergers Central Message in his Government by Judiciary- The Transformation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 467, 469-70 (1979).
81. Quoted in BERGER, supra note 18, at 295-96. For the colonists, Professor Oscar
Handlin observes, consent "became a continuous process by which the people passed upon
the validity of the acts of their rulers." 0. HANDLIN, TRUTH IN HisToRY 310 (1979).
82. HAND, supra note 49, at 70.
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